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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAIRY D'ISTRTBUTORS, INC., 
PkLintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT 
COUNCIL 67, WESTERN CON-
FERENCE OF TE·AMS'TE'RS, 
INTERN ~TION AL B·ROT'HE:R-
HOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEiURS, WARE1HOUSE-
MEN AND HELPERS ·OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, MTLO V. 
RASH, CLARENCE LOTT and 
JOSEPH W. BA:LLEW, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S B'RIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
10'160 
This is a review of ~a nunc pro tunc Order made 
and entered by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, 
District Judge. 
DlSPOSITION IN 'THE LOWER GOUR'T 
The District Court entered a nunc pro tunc 
order requiring the Clerk to correct the record to 
reflect the terms of the judgment initially made in 
the case. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the ruling and action 
of the trial court affirmed. 
ST~TEMENT OF FA:CTS 
'THE HISTORICAL DE'TAI'L OF THE STATEMENT 
OF FACTS OF THE APPgLLANT I'S ESSENTIALLY 
CORRECT. THIS RECITATION HAS BEEN MA'DE 
EVERY TIME THIS COV'RT HAS IBE'EN REQUESTED 
TO PASS UPON ANY PHASE OF 1THI'S LI'TIGAT'ION. 
1The oft-repeated record cited by the Appellants 
in their 'Statement of Facts is but another ,affirma-
tion by them that they have lost at every turn. 
Specific attention is called to page 12 of the 
Appellant's Brief at which place they make a refer-
ence to what the trial court Judge in C1aJliiornia 
decided. 
'There is no record upon this subject but the 
trial judge in California did not say that he wou'ld 
not grant a judgment for interest. He said if he 
applied California law he would certainly grant the 
interest. U·tah law in this connection applies, and 
this the trial judge recognized. 
He, therefore, continued the case until the mat-
ter of interest was clarified by the Utah trial judge, 
or this court, or by the citation of other Utah case::; 
clearly defining the Utah law on this subject. 
2 
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STATEME'NT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE ·JUDGME'NT WAS NOT AMENtDE'D BUT CON-
FORMED TO RECORD WH'AT IN LEGAL ·FA!CT OC-
CURRED WHEN JUDGME'NT WAS ENTERE'D UPON 
THE ORIGINAL VERDI·CT. 
POINT II. 
THE MATTER OF WHETHEH INTEREST AT-
T~CHES AT THE 'STATUTORY RATE TO A 'JUDG-
MENT UPON A VERDICT TS CONTROLLED BY UTAH 
ljAW. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT, 1UN'DER UTAH RULE'S, AND 
LAW, HAS INHERENT POWEH TO 'MAKE ITS REC-
ORDS AOCUR.A:TE AND TO REFLECT WHAT LEGAL 
JUDGMENT WAS EINTERED UPON THE VE'RDICT. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOCAL LAW IGON'TRODS 'THE MAT'TER OF 
INTERES'T ON JUDGMENTS RECOVERED TN STATE 
OR FEDERAL COURTS. 
POINT V. 
THERE IS NO WAY IN WHTCH THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEA!IJS FOR 'THE TE1NTH CIR-
CUIT COUUD POSSJtBLY AFFIRM OR OTHERWISE 
MODIFY THE DE'CIS1ION OF THE UTAH ·SUPREME 
COURT IN THIS O.A:SE. 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT AMENDED BUT ·CON-
FORMED TO REOORD WHAT IN LE1GA!L FA!CT OC-
CURRED WHEN JUDGMENT WAS ENTERE'D UPON 
THE ORIGINAL VERDICT. 
It is the position of the respondent that no 
3 
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amendment to the judgment was made by the tri1al 
court. The action of the trial court was simply to 
conform the original document called a judgment 
to reflect the legal relationship which the judgment 
created. 
The act of the trial judge complained of by the 
appellants was to reflect fue interest which attached 
to the judgment as a matter of law. 
POINT II. 
'THE MATTER OF WHE'THER INTEREST AT-
TACHES AT THE STATUTORY RATE TO A JUDG-
MENT UPON A VERDICT IS CONTROLLED BY UTAH 
L.A:W. 
The respondent relies upon Utah law for the 
attachment of interest to a judgment. The following 
are the rules of procedure and the statute upon 
which the respondent relies. 
Rule 54 (e) provides as follows: 
''Interest and costs to be included in the 
Judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the 
verdict or decision from the time it was ren-
dered, and the costs, if the same have been 
taxed or as'certained. The clerk must, within 
two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in 
the judgment, insert the amount thereof in 
a blank left in the judgment for that pur-
pose, and make a simi'lar notation thereof in 
the Registrar or Actions and in the Judgment 
Docket. 
It is the contention of the respondent further, 
4 
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as will be developed in this brief, that Utah l·aw 
applies. Hence, it is pertinent to observe in this 
connection that there is no Federal rule of similar 
import to Rule 54(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
There is a contention in the appellants' Brief 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are con-
trdlling in this instance and that the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure must have been an unnecessary 
exercise in futility and repetition. The respondent 
does not so lightly regard the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The respondent further relies upon Rules 60(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which pro-
vides as fol'lows: 
"' (a) Clerical M'istakes. Clerical mis-
takes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record an'd errors therein arising fron1 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time (emphasis ours) of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mis-
takes may be so corrected before the appeal 
is docketed in the appellate court, and there-
after while the a ppea;I is pending may be so 
corre~ted with leave of the appellate court." 
The statute upon which the respondent relies 
with respect to the attachment of interest to a judg-
ment is 15-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, which r~ads 
as follovvs: 
"Interest on Judgments. Any judgment 
5 
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rendered on a lawful contract shall conform 
thereto and shaH bear the interest agreed 
upon by the parties which shari be specified 
in the judgment; other judgments shall bear 
interest at the ~ate of 8% per annum." 
'The consideration and the construction of these 
provisions of our Rules of Civil iProce'dure and our 
statute make it apparent that notwithstanding the 
failure of the Clerk to write in the figure 8% in 
the original judgment document, is not controlling 
and that these provisions of our rules and statutes 
are. 
'POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT, UNDE'R UTA'H RVL1E'S, AND 
LAW, HAS INHERENT POWER TO MAKE ITS REC-
ORDS AOCURATE AND 'TO REFLECT WHAT LEGAL 
JUDGMENT WAS E1NTERED UPON THE VEHDICT. 
This Court and others have frequently held 
that a trial judge has the inherent power to correct 
any record to make it reflect accurately what tr,ans-
pired in any legal proceeding before the trial judge. 
Representative of these decisions are the fol-
lowing cases decided by this Court. 
Kettner vs. Snow, 3'75 P.2d 28, 13 U.2d 382, 
384. 
The decision cited is the 19'6'2 opinion of this 
Court. It came to this court as an original proceed-
ing by the defendants in the trial court to prohibit 
the tria'! court from further pro'ceeding with the 
matter. 
It arose out of an action for recovery of dam-
6 
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ages for personal injuries and property. A jury 
returned a verdict of no cause of action. The plain-
tiffs in the trial court permitted the time to go by 
within which they might have served ~and filed a 
Motion for New Trial. Later they presented to the 
trial court an order permitting them to file a mo-
tion for new trial which was signed by the District 
Judge nunc pro tunc. A further order was also pre-
sented to the District Judge which he signed, per-
mitting the expanding of time within which an 
affidavit in support of the Motion might be filed. 
This Court held that under the circumstances 
existing in that case the trial judge di'd not have 
the authority to change the rules and to permit, by 
the filing of an order nunc pro tunc, the increase 
of tin1e which the rules had 'limited. 
The case is, however, ·cited for the expression of 
the general law in the opinion by Mr. Justice Croc-
kett, which says as follows : 
"We are not unmindful of the fact that 
that in proper circumstances, where the in-
terest of justice so require the court has 
power to a'ct nunc pro tun~, that is, to do an 
act upon one date and make it effective as 
of a prior date. It is recognized that clerical 
errors may be corrected or omissions supplied 
so the record will accurately reflect that which 
in fact took p'lace." 
As already indicated, it is the position of the 
respon'dent that what Judge Anderson did in this 
case by reason of his order nunc pro tunc was simply 
7 
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to correct the record so it accurately reflected that 
which in fact took place. 
The second case which the respondent asserts 
in support of its position, is Cook vs. Gardner, 381 
P.2d 78, 14 U.'2d f9'3, 195. This action arose by rea-
son of the suit of the plain tiff against the widow and 
the executrix of his business associate to compel 
transfer to him of certain shares of stock. The plain-
tiff prevailed and the defendant appealed. One of 
the points of attack upon the judgment made by 
the :appellant was that the action below was at one 
time dismissed on the defendant's motion and the 
minute entry said that it was dismissed with pre-
judice. 
'Thereafter the trial judge entered an order 
saying that the action was dismissed without pre-
judice. 
The appellant's contention was that the trial 
judge had improperly inserted the word "without" in 
its order in 'contravention of the previous minute 
order entry. 
The opinion df this Court, also by Mr. Justice 
Crockett, said as follows : 
"'The contention of the appellant is with 
out merit. First because it is the prerogative 
of the court to correct any error or supply any 
deficiency in its records that m:ay have oc-
curred because of mistake or inadvertance." 
These two cases are simply cited for the ori-
ginal principle that. the trial court has the inherent 
8 
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right to n1ake its records conform with that which 
was legally done. 
The respondent commends to the attention of 
the court the case of Howard vs. Howard, 298 P .2d 
48, 49, 50, a 19156 case of the District Court of Ap-
peals of the Second District, Division 1, of the State 
of 'California. 
The case was an appeal by the defendant hus-
band from an order denying the appellant's motion 
asking that the County Clerk be directed to enter a 
full satisfaction of an interlocutory judgment of 
divorce, with particular respect to an attorney's 
fee and costs. And further, that the Sheriff cease 
making attempts to collect interest on the judgment 
for attorney's fees. 
There was no controversy with respect to the 
fees ordered to be paid to the wife's attorney, and 
the only question in the lawsuit involved the matter 
of whether interest was allowable upon the judg-
ment. 
In that case the respondent's position was that 
any judgment awarding money, automatically bore 
interest on the judgment at the rate of 77a (the 
rate in California), until paid, even though the 
form of judgment itself ma'de no provision for inter-
est thereon. 
The trial court's language, which was quoted 
by the appellate court in this case, is as follows: 
"It seems to me a simple elementary tiring 
9 
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where one party deprives another party of 
money which is rightfully theirs, pursuant to 
court order, it bears interest 7 7o from the 
date due. That it my holding." 
The appellate court further quoted the trial 
court in this regard :as follows : 
"I am not concerned with the forms in 
any respect. Both of you have to some extent 
relied on what the forms contain or omit. I 
don't think that is the ~least bit material. 'The 
only question is, what is the law. Does the 
law provide for interest on attorney's fee or 
does it not? If the forms :are inadequate they 
will have to be changed then, not the 1aw." 
The opinion of the appela:te court contains the 
following language which the respondent feels is 
applicab'le in this case. 
''Likewise, appellant's arguments that 
the form and wording of the writ of execu-
tion precludes allowance of interest or that 
its use by respondent constitutes a waiver 
of interest are without merit. As observed by 
the trial court, the allowance of interest on a. 
money judgment is not dependent upon forms 
or phr.aseology but is automaticaHy allowed 
by law." 
It is precisely this doctrine upon which the 
respondent depends. Finally tlle respondent urges 
that a consideration of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the statutes require the appli~ation 
of the language just cited. 
10 
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POINT IV. 
THE LOCAL LAW CONTROLS THE MATTER OF 
INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS RECOVERED IN STATE 
01~ FE'DERAL COURTS. 
The original action w.as filed, tried and judg-
ment rendered in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. That State 'Dis-
trict Court was authorized to entertain jurisdiction 
by the Federal Congress under the provisions of 
Section 303 (b) , Labor Management Relations Act, 
61 Stat. 158. 
With respect to this authorization the Tenth 
Circuit Court in its opinion relating to a previous 
appeal in this case, reported as Dairy Distributors, 
Inc. vs. Western Conference of Teamsters, 294 
F.2d 348 (lOth Cir., Utah), stated: 
''The grant of jurisdiction to state courts 
to try and de~ide certain issues under the 
Labor Management Act carries with it the 
inherent power to interpret the act and to 
decide factual matters necessary for the pro-
per and lawful administration of the act. 'The 
grant of such jurisdiction to State Courts and 
the similar grant to the United States Dis-
trict Court does not contemplate the 'dual 
remedy or a dry run in either ·court." 
With the grant of jurisdiction to try such cases, 
the Federal Congress also left to the local state courts 
the procedures by which such cases would be tried 
and the nature of judgments which would reflect 
their determination. As heretofore observed, Utah 
law requires that judgments rendered sh:a1ll bear 
11 
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interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Section 15-1-4, 
U.C.A., 195'3. The result in this respect could not 
have been different had the trial been conducted and 
judgment rendered in the Federal ·District Court of 




'Interest shall be allowed on 1any money 
judgment in a civ1l case recovered in a District 
Court. Exe·cution therefor may be levied by 
the marshall in any case where, by the law 
of the 'State in which such court is held, exe-
cution may he levied for interest on judg-
ments recovered in the courts of the state. 
Such interest shaN be calculated from the date 
of the entry of the judgment at the rate al-
lowed by the 'State law. June '25, 1'94'8, c 646, 
6'2 Stat. 9'5 7." 
'The purpose of this statute an'd its predecessor, 
·2'8 U.S. C.A. Sec. 811, which was overlooked or ig-
nored by appellant in its brief, as stated in the case 
of Washington and G. R. Co. vs. Harmon, (1'89'3), 
147 U.S. '5711, was to bring about uniformity between 
the state courts and the federal courts sitting with-
in the state upon the subject of interest. Without 
the statute a successful plaintiff, suing on a cause 
of action o'f which the state and federal ·courts had 
concurrent jurisdiction, would be deprived of in-
terest on his judgment by proceeding in the federal 
court. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Massachusett.'3 
Benefit Association vs. Miles, 137 U.S. 689 (1891), 
stated with respect to interest on judgments: 
12 
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"The courts of the states and the federal 
court sitting within the state should always be 
in harmony on this point. Both in Holden v. 
Trust Co., 100 U.S. 72, and in Ohio v. Frank, 
103 U.S. 697, it was held that the question of 
interest is always one of local law." 
Again, in the case of Klaxon Co. vs. Stentor Co., 
31'3 U.S. 487 (1941), Justi~e Reed speaking for 
the court determined that the allowance of interest 
on a judgment obtained in a Federal Court, or the 
method df determining it, was a procedural matter 
and not substantive, and that " ... the proper func-
tion of the Delaware Federal Court is to ascertain 
what the state law is, not what it ought to be." 
The application of '28 U.S.C.A. Section t961 is 
mandatory. In Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d '260 (6th 
Cir, '1943), judgment was entered for $'6,500.00 
and costs but was silent on the question of interest. 
The Circuit Court affirmed the Fe'deral District 
Court and the mandate was a:lso silent as to the 
provision of interest. On petition the Circuit Court 
ruled that the interest was applicable from the date 
of judgment unti'l paid at the same rate provided in 
similar judgments in the Courts of Tennessee, the 
state in which the Court was sitting. The foUowing 
is taken from the language of the opinion (page 
261): 
"The court, in the present case, had no 
discretion in the rna tter of withholding or 
awarding interest. Therefore, the fact that 
the judgment of the trial'court and the man-
date of this court made no specific award of 
13 
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interest, is immaterial. 'The allowance of the 
legal rate of interest under the laws of the 
State of Tennessee and for the period pro-
vided under '28 U.'S.C.A. Sec. 8'1'1, was man-
datory." 
The Federal stature mentioned automatically 
implements the interest provisions of Seetion 1'5-1-4 
U.C.A., 1'953, on the judgment here involved. The 
appellant, however, 'Contends that while a state court 
may be authorized to try and render judgments in 
controversy involving a Feder,aJl law, that it has no 
authority "to add to a judgment interest on the 
judgment rendered". (Appellants' Brief, p. 15). It 
is true that a state court or a federal court is with-
out power to add ''pre-judgment interest" as a part 
of the compensable damages. However, this has no 
reference to the interest required by statute to run on 
the judgment itself. 'The opinion in the case of Moore-
McCormack Lines v. Amirault, 202 F.2d 89'3, 895, 
('1st Cir., 19'53) is explicit on this point. 
"* * *[A] distinction must be made be-
tween (1) the running of interest upon a 
judgment debt from the date the judgment 
was entered to the date of payment, and ('2) 
the allowance of pre-judgment interest to be 
included as an i tern of damages in the total 
amount of an ensuing money judgment, in 
order that the plaintiff may be more fully and 
justly compensated for the wrong complained 
of. The latter may be regarded as a part of 
the substance of tlle claims sued upon, for 
which a money judgment is sought. 
"'28 N.S.C. Sec. 1961 belongs in category 
14 
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( 1 ) above. The provisions of Section 811 of 
the Act of August 23, 1942, 5 State. 518. The 
purpose was simply to provide that money 
judgments of federal courts should bear in-
terest from the date of the entry of the judg.:. 
ment collectible in the same way and at the 
same rate as provided in the local state law 
for the allowance of interest on money judg-
ments recovered in state courts. Interest upon 
the amount of a money judgment rendered 
by a federal 'Court runs autom~a:tically, by the 
manadatory provision of 2'8 U.S.C. Sec. 1'9'61, 
even though the judgment itseTf - as in 'the 
case at 'bar -contains no specific award of 
such interest .... But 128 'U.S.C. Section 1961 
has no bearing on the problem whether pre-
judgment interest is allowable as an item of 
damages on a particular claim, to be incl uaed 
in the total amount of the money judgment." 
The authorities cited by the appellant at page 
15 of its Brier, refer to matters relating to pre-judg-
ment interest, or similar situations and are not in 
point insofar as this case is concerned. They do not 
deal with judgments rendered as in the present case, 
nor do they involve a state statute requiring the 
application of interest upon the judgment. 
In the recent case of Wood mont, Inc. vs. D:aniels, 
290 F.2d 186 (lOth Cir., Utah 19'61), the Tenth 
Circuit Court held that Sec. 15-1-4, U.C.A., 11953, 
required that interest be allowed on a judgment even 
though the prevailing party participated affirma-
tively on appeal It further observed that where in-
terest on a judgment is not specifically fixed in 
some other manner, the law of the state is ·control-
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~ing. The appellant admits that the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act ('Taft-Hartley Act) is silent 
''as to whether or not a 'judgment such as here in-
volved is to bear interest" (Appellant's Brief p. 17). 
Thus, by its own admission, and the application of 
the Federal statute and case law, the interest pro-
vision contained in Se·ction 15-1-4, U.C.A. ('19'53), 
is effective in the present case, and the allowance of 
interest on the judgment at the statutory rate of 8 7o 
per annum is proper from the date of entry of said 
judgment. 
POINT V. 
'THE'R'E IS NO W'AY IN WHI1GH THE UNITED 
STATES COUR'T OF A1PPEALS FOR TiRE TEN'TH CIR-
CUIT COUUD 'POSSIBLY AFFIRM OR OT-HERWISE 
MODIFY THE DECISION OF THE UTXH SUPREME 
COURT IN THIS C.A:SE. 
In support of Point V of the Brief, it is 
necessary to quote from the Appellants' Brief, par-
ticularly with reference to that material which ap-
pears on page '26. 
"It therefore follows that when the Su-
preme Court of Utah and the Tenth Circuit 
Court of app6als affirmed the Jt~dgment ren-
dered by the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the trial court was bound by 
the judgment so render.ed and may not ignore 
the mandate or direction of the appellate 
courts. '(Emphasis adde'd) 
·The contention of the appellant that the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of 
the Utah Supreme Court, or more particularly the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 'Utah, is 
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not only difficult to understand, but impossible to 
support. 
In support of the position of the responden1t in 
this matter, all that need be done is to make refer-
ence to the appendix of the Appellant's Brief where 
it relates to the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the 'Tenth Circuit. 
It is necessary at this point to make reference 
to the proceeding in the United States District Court 
in Salt Lake City, in which it was attempted to en-
join the collection or enforcement of the judgment. 
From the injunction ordered and entered by 
the United States District Judge, an appeal was 
taken to the United States Circuit Court for the 
Tenth Circuit. 
Having reviewed the matter, the United States 
Circuit Court of the 'Tenth Circuit, reversed and 
remanded that decision of the United States 'District 
Judge. The final statement of the United States 
Circuit Court is as follows : 
"Reversed and remanded with directions 
to vacate the injunction." 
The most cursory review of the decision of 
the Tenth Circuit Court could conclude wi'th nothing 
but that the appellate court had in clear and direct 
language, told the United States Judge for the Dis-
trict of Utah, that he had made a mistake and they 
erased the decision he made to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the judgment. 
There is no conceivable way in which the judg-
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ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit could be construed as having passed 
upon the recti tude of the decision of the Third Disw 
trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, or 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons delineated heretofore, it is re-
spectfully suggested that this court should approve 
and affirm the urder of Judge Aldon Anderson from 
which this appeal was taken. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX J. HA·NSON 
MERLIN R. L YBBER·T 
A:R·T·HUR A. AL\LEN, JR. 
Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
18 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
